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ABSTRACT
Energy, Time and Security (ETS) properties of programs are becom-
ing increasingly prioritised by developers, especially where appli-
cations are running on ETS sensitive systems, such as embedded
devices or the Internet of Things. Moreover, developers currently
lack tools and language properties to allow them to reason about
ETS. In this paper, we introduce a new contract specification frame-
work, called Drive, which allows a developer to reason about ETS
or other non-functional properties of their programs as first-class
properties of the language. Furthermore, we introduce a contract
specification language, allowing developers to reason about these
first-class ETS properties by expressing contracts that are proved
correct by an underlying formal type system. Finally, we show
our contract framework over a number of representable examples,
demonstrating provable worst-case ETS properties.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Software and its engineering → Formal software verifica-
tion; Imperative languages; Software maintenance tools; • Security
and privacy→ Software security engineering.
KEYWORDS
IDRIS, C, time, energy, security, non-functional properties, proofs,
verification, contracts
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1 INTRODUCTION
Non-functional properties, such as time, energy and security, are
becoming critically important in areas ranging from small-scale
sensors, through smart cyber-physical systems and mobile devices,
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to data centres, despite it being treated as a secondary concern. As
embedded devices become more commonplace, increasing is the
pressing demand for more time and energy optimisation in applica-
tions that execute on them, leading to longer battery lives and more
efficient software. Moreover, systems are becoming increasingly
vulnerable to timing and power leakage resulting in security prob-
lems, such as side-channel attacks, for example. However, dealing
with time, energy and security properties at the language level is
usually a black art, where developers require the use of specialised
skills, low-level tools and techniques.
Therefore, there is a clear and pressing need to expose non-
functional concerns to the systems designer and implementor in
an accessible way. What we need is a way to turn energy con-
sumption, execution time, security level and other important (non-
functional) program properties into first-class citizens. This will
allow (non-expert) programmers to understand and directly ma-
nipulate them. Consequently, this will eliminate both the com-
plex, time-consuming and error-prone use of extrinsic tools as well
as large-scale continuous testing for non-functional program be-
haviour from the software engineering process and, thus, make the
latter significantly more lean, agile and productive. By exposing en-
ergy, time, security, etc., as first-class citizens and by making them
easy to use and understand for application programmers, we will
eliminate the need for dual-expertise: the application programmer
will be able to manipulate and precisely reason about energy, time,
security, etc. as normal program values, directly interacting with
analytical and optimisation frameworks. They will ensure that so-
lutions meet system requirements as needed while at the same time
they are highly optimised for metrics without strict requirements.
In this paper we present a novel framework, calledDrive, to allow
the programmer to model non-functional properties of time, energy
and security in their C source-code as first-class citizens; express
resource contracts on time, energy and security usage, directly
through source-level constructs; and verify these contracts fully
automatically using the dependently typed programming language,
Idris. We give explicit proofs of these correct properties, together
with a denotational semantics of our contract system. In this way,
we show our system constructs verified contracts. We illustrate the
technique by considering a number of examples in C, as might be
commonly found in real-time embedded systems, from the Beebs
benchmarks suite.
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1.1 Contributions
(1) We introduce a new model, exploiting dependent types, for
expressing non-functional properties as provable contracts
and assertions.
(2) We introduce a new Embedded Domain Specific Language
(EDSL), called CSL, or Contract Specification Language, al-
lowing programmers to annotate their programs with non-
functional properties and contracts.
(3) We present a novel contract framework, called Drive, for
modelling Energy, Time and Security (ETS) or other non-
functional properties of programs as first-class properties of
the language, building upon CSL the aforementioned model.
(4) We evaluate our contract system on a number of examples
from the Beebs benchmark suite, demonstrating that our
contract system allows the programmer to provide provable
contracts of worst-case time properties of their programs.
We also show in principle examples of energy and security
properties, leaving these as a study for future work.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Dependent Types
Idris is a pure, dependently typed functional language, developed
at the University of St Andrews. The syntax of Idris is similar to
Haskell [23], and like Haskell, Idris supports algebraic data types
with pattern matching, type classes, and do-notation. Unlike Has-
kell, Idris evaluates its terms eagerly, and has a richer type system,
supporting full-spectrum dependent types, allowing the program-
mer to define types that may be predicated on values. By extension,
this allows properties within the program to be expressed in a type
and verified by the type-checking system [5].
Dependent types extend the idea of static type systems typically
used in functional programming to allow types to become first class
citizens, i.e. to be passed as values and manipulated as values in the
programming space, and, as values, can be passed as arguments
to functions and be returned by functions, just like any over value
in the language [43]. The power of making types first class is that
types can now depend upon values. Consider the following Idris
type.
1 NatOrList : (b : Bool) -> Type
2 NatOrList False = Nat
3 NatOrList True = List Nat
This program defines a new type, NatOrList that, for some boolean
value, b, returns a type that is either Nat, representing the natural
numbers, or List Nat , representing a list of the natural numbers.
Extending this idea, we can now define the following Idris function.
1 ZeroOrNil : (b : Bool) -> NatOrList b
2 ZeroOrNil False = Z
3 ZeroOrNil True = []
Here, ZeroOrNil is a function that takes as argument a boolean value,
b. If b is False, ZeroOrNat returns Z, representing the zeroth element of
the natural numbers in standard peano arithmetic, and the empty
list, [], otherwise. The return type of this function therefore depends
on the value of its argument. If the argument is True the return type
is a natural number; if it is False, it is a list type.
Allowing types to depend upon values results in more expres-
sive types that can be sufficiently tightly constrained in order to
express some property of one or more values; e.g. that a given list
is ordered. In conjunction with the Curry-Howard correspondence,
where a type represents a proposition whose inhabitants represent
the proof of the proposition [43], logical and arithmetic formulae
may be expressed and reasoned about as types in a manner that is
consistent with some underlying constructive logic. This allows us,
for a given context, to determine not only whether some logical
expression holds, but also the reason (proof) why the expression
holds. Moreover, for some expressions, it is possible to automatically
determine such proofs, which we discuss further in Section 5.
2.2 Deriving Models
AsDrive is a fully automated framework fromC source code through
to a type-verified contract produced by Idris, we require a mecha-
nism to transform C source code into Idris data-types, representing
our C space of properties and assertions. In order to parse C, we
make use of, and extend, an already existing C99 parser that is
implemented in Haskell, called Language C1, which is a Haskell li-
brary providing static analyses and generation of C code. It features
a complete C parser and pretty printer for the full C99 standard,
and a large set of C11 CLang/GNU extensions. For this paper, we
have modified and extended Language-C, so that it parses CSL
statements and assertions, generating Idris code as a result. This
generated Idris is then used by the Idris contract system, an example
of the generated output is given in Listing 2. This allows us to fully
automate our Drive framework: providing an automatic compiler
from (C99) CSL to an Idris contract.
2.3 Non-functional Properties
In this paper we consider three non-functional properties that we
consider to be most commonplace: energy, time and security. In
terms of time, we consider the worst-case execution time (WCET )
obtained by executing the code with various underlying profiling
tools such as the WCC compiler produced by the University of
Hamburg [13]. Energy measurements are obtained by measuring
the amount of energy in Joules (J) that is used by a complete proces-
sor package; i.e. we measure the total energy that is drawn by each
hardware CPU socket. Energy results are obtained manually for the
purposes of this paper, using Intel’s Running Average Power Limit
(RAPL) [11] system to collect this information, using model spe-
cific registers (MSR) to access the RAPL measurements. The MSRs
provide accurate power readings for various systems components
within each package e.g. the GPU and DIMMs. The same mecha-
nism also allows energy consumption to be controlled/capped. We
take the RAPL estimation of energy for the overall execution of
the application. RAPL records power usage in terms of Watts (i.e.
Joules per second). We calculate energy usage by computing the
rate of change in power per unit of time using the formulae shown
below:
1available on Hackage at http://hackage.haskell.org/package/language-c
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Energy = Power × Time
Joules = Watts × Seconds
Security encompasses many aspects of interest. Communication
properties like confidentiality/secrecy [40] or integrity [9] of the
sent/received data, or even vulnerability to the most powerful at-
tacker [15], can be captured by information-flow policies [4] or
trace-based properties like non-interference [17] to prevent covert
channels (unintentional transmission of sensitive information by us-
ing intended communication channels). A side-channel is a way of
transmitting information (purposely or not) to another system out
of the standard (intended) communication channels. Side-channel
attacks aim at breaking cryptography by exploiting information
that is revealed by an algorithm’s physical execution. For instance,
observing execution time [28] or power profile [27] may reveal
secret information. We focus on these time- and power-related se-
curity properties in Section 4.2, to emphasize the relations between
these three non-functional properties. Another computational prop-
erty is the vulnerability to faults [52] injected during the execution
in order to retrieve sensitive information from the alteration of the
behavior of the program.
In this paper, we omit the details of obtaining such non-functio-
nal information, leaving it for future work to extend the Drive
system with suitable linkage to automated tools (such as WCC [13])
to obtain the information automatically. However, our system in-
fers the resource usage costs from a variety of underlying tools
that are both dynamic and static, rather than performing static
analysis on the source code itself. This gives the advantage of
relying on real-world resource costs that are taken from actual
measurements of time and energy from the execution profile of the
application. Examples of such underlying tools are the AbsInt tool
for instruction-level energy analysis [49], TimeWeaver for hybrid
worst-case execution time analysis [25], and WCC for worst-case
timing analysis of C source code and static energy models, such as
those provided by Eder et al. [34].
3 ENERGY, TIME AND SECURITY
CONTRACTS
Drive is a framework for forming contracts to support the inexpe-
rienced and possibly unskilled developer with the tools and tech-
niques to reason about time, energy and security properties as
first class citizens of the underlying language. Although Drive is,
in theory, completely language independent, we demonstrate its
effectiveness and generality on the C programming language, a lan-
guage very commonly used for programming embedded systems.
The workflow for using Drive is shown in Figure 1.
Starting with an original C source program, the programmer
first annotates the source with annotations, by using a Contract
Specification Language, a domain-specific language that extends
C with special annotations and contract specification definitions
(described in Section 4) describing non-functional properties of their
source code and assertions (or contracts) around those properties.
This annotated source code, with non-functional properties and
assertions, is then passed through an ANSI C(99) parser (described
in Section 2.2), which takes the annotated source code and produces
a generated Idris model of the source code. This generated Idris
model is a high-level abstract representation of the C program with
its CSL annotations and assertions, which we pass to an underlying
automated proof engine (also implemented in Idris) in order to
verify that the programmer-defined certificate is valid or not. In
addition to verifying the certificate, the CSL source code may be
also passed to underlying tooling that may acquire further non-
functional information about the execution of the application, such
as timing, energy and security information. If the contracts are met,
the result of the whole process is a certified C source program.
3.1 Motivating Example
Listing 1: Dijkstra C example, showing annotations in CSL
1 int time_spent, comparison_time;
2 ...
3 int dijkstra(int G[NUM_NODES][NUM_NODES], int chStart, int chEnd)
4 {
5 ...
6 int comparison_time, time_spent;
7 while (qcount() > 0)
8 {
9 QITEM *tmp = dequeue (&iNode, &iDist, &iPrev);
10 if(tmp != 0)
11 free(tmp);
12 __csl_time_worst_iter(&comparison_time);
13 for (i = 0; i < NUM_NODES; i++)
14 {
15 iCost = G[iNode][i];
16 if (iCost != 0)
17 {
18 if ((NONE == rgnNodes[i].iDist) ||
19 (rgnNodes[i].iDist > (iCost + iDist)))
20 {
21 rgnNodes[i].iDist = iDist + iCost;
22 rgnNodes[i].iPrev = iNode;
23 enqueue (i, iDist + iCost, iNode);
24 }
25 }
26 }
27 }
28 ..
29 }
30 ...
31 __csl_time_worst(&time_spent);
32 output[output_count] = dijkstra(G,0,NUM_NODES-1);
33 ...
34 __csl_assert(time_spent <= (EDGES * log (NUM_NODES)) *
comparison_time);
35 ...
We consider the Dijkstra algorithm as implemented in the Beebs
[37] benchmarks as a motivating example; an extract of the code
is shown in Listing 1. In this example, the programmer requires a
guarantee of the worst-case complexity of the algorithm, which is
O(e logv), where e = number of edges and v = number of vertices.
This is achieved by adding annotations to the source code calling
various CSL functions. These CSL functions obtain various non-
functional properties about the program’s execution, such as worst
and average case time, energy usage and even security information
(illustrated in Section 4.2). This is information that is obtained from
underlying profiling and modelling tools. When the program is
executed, the CSL framework will automatically call the underlying
tooling and assign the results of the profiling and/or analysis to
the C variable that is passed as an argument to the CSL function.
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Figure 1: The Drive framework for producing contracts of non-functional properties of C programs
CSL annotations always immediately proceed a C statement (where
a C statement can be any valid C statement) that is intended to
be measured with either a time, energy or security non-functional
property.
Examples of these CSL annotations are shown in Listing 1, where
the programmer has added two annotations to the program source.
The annotation on Line 12, __csl_time_worst_iter(&comparison_time
); takes the average worst-case time metric for the loop defined
immediately after, on Line 12, and assigns it to the regular C variable,
comparison_time, which is defined, in the normal C fashion on Line
6; the average is calculated as the arithmetic mean over the loop
iterations. The annotation on Line 31, __csl_time_worst(&time_spent)
;, takes the worst-case-execution-time (WCET) for the execution
of the proceeding C statement on Line 32, and assigns it to the
C variable, time_spent (defined on Line 6). This measurement is
obtained by calling an underlying tool that calculates the worst case
execution time and assigns the result to the C variable, time_spent.
By assigning the values of the non-functional properties to regular
C variables in this way allows the non-functional properties to
become first-class properties of the C language itself: they can be
used in the same way regular C variables can be used. This means
they can be part of conditionals, loop bounds, etc.
Finally, the assertion of the complexity being an upper bound,
is expressed as a contract in the program source. This contract is
written as an assertion in the source code at Line 34 in Listing 1. This
assertion is translated down into an underlying automated proof
mechanism that generates a contract that the assertion holds for the
given expression. In this paper, we use Idris as our proof mechanism,
details of which are described in Section 5. In this example, the
programmer states in the source code what the contract should be,
by the statement, __csl_assert(time_spent <= (EDGES * log (NUM_NODES)
)* comparison_time);. Here, EDGES and NUM_NODES are regular C variables
that are defined in scope; log is the standard logarithmic function.
Listing 2: Example Idris code generated by C Parser for Di-
jkstra
1 import Drive
2 mutual
3 dijkstra : CLang
4 dijkstra = BlockTime "comparison_time" 23 $ DecVar "EDGES"
1026 $ DecVar "NUM_NODES" 256 $ BlockTime "time_spent"
32933 $ Assert dijkstra_assert $ Halt
5
6
7 dijkstra_assert : Env -> Assertion
8 dijkstra_assert env =
9 let
10 p0 = (Var "time_spent")
11 p0' = eval env p0
12
13 p1 = (Var "EDGES")
14 p1' = eval env p1
15
16 p2 = (Var "NUM_NODES")
17 p2' = eval env p2
18
19 p3 = (Var "comparison_time")
20 p3' = eval env p3
21
22 p4 = (Mul (Mul p1 (Log p2)) p3)
23 p4' = eval env p4
24 in
25 MkAssertion ( ( LTE p0 p4)
26 (MkEvald p0 p0')
27 (MkEvald p4 p4')
28 (isLTE p0' p4' ))
The source code then passes through our CSL compiler : compris-
ing an extended C parser, which parses the C and CSL constructs,
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and generating an Idris program that is then executed by the con-
tract system. The code that is generated by the parser is shown
in Listing 2. In the listing, the Idris definition, dijkstra, on Line 5,
represents an abstract high-level model of the C program in List-
ing 1, except that all of the superfluous structural detail have been
removed, leaving only the information that is required to assert the
contract. In this case, the only information that is required to verify
the assertion are the variables representing the C variables of the as-
sertion, and any variables being assigned values of non-functional
information. dijkstra_assert models the assertion, where p0 etc. are
generated definitions. The types, MkAssertion etc. are described in
more detail in Section 5.
Listing 3: Example Idris contract for Dijkstra showing veri-
fied assertion
1 ([("time_spent", 32933), ("NUM_NODES", 256), ("EDGES", 1026), ("
comparison_time", 23)],
2 [MkAssertion (LTE (Var "time_spent")
3 (Mul (Mul (Var "EDGES") (Log (Var "NUM_NODES"))) (
Var "comparison_time"))
4 (MkEvald (Var "time_spent") 32933)
5 (MkEvald (Mul (Mul (Var "EDGES") (Log (Var "
NUM_NODES"))) (Var "comparison_time"))
6 ...
7 (Yes (LTESucc (LTESucc ...
This generated Idris code is then passed to the Idris engine (de-
scribed in Section 5), which produces a certificate, shown in List-
ing 3. In the listing, we see the result of verifying the assertion that
was expressed in Listing 1 at Line 34 as a value in the DecEq type
in Idris. Using DecEq gives us a decidable result as to whether the
assertion holds for the given variables, or it does not. In Listing 3,
we can see that, on Line 7, Idris returns Yes, indicating the assertion
holds. This result is a certificate, proved correct by the underlying
Idris type system.
4 CONTRACT SPECIFICATION LANGUAGE
The Contract Specification Language (CSL) is an Embedded Domain
Specific Language (EDSL), allowing the programmer to annotate
their source code in order to reason about non-functional proper-
ties as first-class citizens. CSL is both comprehensible to the pro-
grammer, and precise and detailed enough to support the required
compiler optimisations and transformations. Therefore, CSL allows
suitable annotations to be integrated into the program source, mak-
ing it possible for the programmer and compiler to understand
and reason about, e.g., energy, time, and security properties of the
program. In order to illustrate the concept, we define CSL for C,
but it can, in principle, be extended to other languages.
4.1 Expressing Time and Energy Properties
In order to express properties of time and energy, the programmer
is required to annotate the source code with CSL annotations that
make time and/or energy values available. Listing 4 shows the CSL
annotations for assigning time values for a given statement, where
annotations are defined as functions. These fall into three different
aspects: worst-case (Line 1), best-case (Line 7), and average-case
(Line 4) execution time. Each CSL annotation acts like a normal C
Listing 4: CSL time annotations
1 __csl_time_worst(&variable);
2 stmt1;
3
4 __csl_time_average(&variable);
5 stmt2;
6
7 __csl_time_best(&variable);
8 stmt3;
function, where the parameter is a variable that is in scope. Each an-
notation must be placed before a regular C statement. Semantically,
the annotation provides a measurement for the non-functional met-
ric of the proceeding statement. Intuitively, this is equivalent to an
assignment.
Listing 5: CSL time example
1 double loop_time;
2
3 __csl_time_worst(&loop_time);
4 for(int i =0; i < BOUND; i++){
5 f(i);
6 }
For example, in Listing 5, the for-loop (Lines 4–6) is annotated with
__csl_time_worst(&loop_time) (Line 3) in order to obtain its worst-case
execution time measurement. This value is stored in the variable,
loop_time, which is passed by reference. The __csl_time_worst annota-
tion will update the variable loop_time with the value of the metric
measured.
Listing 6: CSL energy annotations
1 __csl_energy_worst(&variable);
2 stmt4;
3
4 __csl_energy_average(&variable);
5 stmt5;
6
7 __csl_energy_best(&variable);
8 stmt6;
Capturing energy measurements behaves in a very similar man-
ner to capturing time measurements. Listing 6 shows the CSL anno-
tations for assigning energy values. Similar to the time annotations
of Listing 4, there are three possible annotations for energy: worst-
case (Line 1), average-case (Line 4), and best-case (Line 7). These
energy annotations also directly precede a C statement, captur-
ing the measured energy measurement for the execution of that
statement.
Listing 7: CSL example (revision 1)
1 double loop_time;
2
3 __csl_energy_worst(&loop_energy);
4 for(int i =0; i < BOUND; i++){
5 f(i);
6 }
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For example, we might modify Listing 5 to measure energy in
instead of time by replacing the annotation on Line 3. The resulting
code, in Listing 7, will assign loop_energy the measurement for the
worst-case energy usage for the for-loop.
Listing 8: CSL accumulator annotations
1 for(...) {
2 __csl_time_average_iter(&variable)
3 stmt1;
4
5 __csl_time_worst_iter(&variable)
6 stmt2;
7
8 __csl_time_best_iter(&variable);
9 stmt3;
10 }
CSL can be further extended with measurement annotations
by using an underlying tool capable of making such desired mea-
surements. One useful set of annotations, for example, is for the
purpose of measuring statements within a loop context. Listing 8
shows the CSL annotations for assigning time values for a given
statement that is within the body of a loop. As before, there are
three kinds: worst-case (Line 4), best-case (Line 7), and average-
case (Line 2). The worst-case annotation captures the worst time
seen for stmt2 over all iterations of the loop. Similarly, the best-case
annotation captures the best time seen for stmt3 over all iterations
of the loop. Finally, the average-case annotation captures the mean
average time of stmt1 over all iterations of the loop. For example, in
Listing 9, we extend Listing 5 by adding an accumulator annotation.
Listing 9: CSL accumulator example
1 double loop_time;
2 double ave_stmt_time;
3
4 __csl_time_worst(&loop_time);
5 for(int i =0; i < BOUND; i++){
6 __csl_time_average_iter(&ave_stmt_time);
7 f(i);
8 }
Here, the annotation on Line 5 captures the average amount of time
the f(i) operation on Line 6 takes for 0 < i < BOUND.
For all declaration annotations above, it is possible to change the
default unit by supplying an optional string parameter that lets the
programmer choose an appropriate unit to measure; e.g., in milli-
seconds, seconds, nanoseconds, for time, and joules and watts·seconds
for energy. In our illustrative implementation, the default option
for time is milliseconds and the default for energy is joules.
4.2 Expressing Security Properties
CSL annotations may be extended to non-functional properties
other than time and energy. In order to illustrate this, we consider
a small subset of security properties, with particular emphasis on
side-channel attacks. We define three annotations in Listing 10
for capturing security levels for both side-channel attacks (Lines 1
and 4) and fault injection (Line 7). As in Section 4.1, security an-
notations act like a normal C function, where the parameter is a
variable that is in scope. Each annotation is placed before a regular
Listing 10: CSL annotations for security properties
1 __csl_security_sca_time(&variable);
2 stmt1;
3
4 __csl_security_sca_power(&variable);
5 stmt2;
6
7 __csl_security_fault_injection(&variable);
8 stmt3;
C statement. Semantically, the annotation provides a security level
for the proceeding statement. For the purposes of this paper, the
security level of a statement is obtained from a given tool, e.g. [38]
for time, that inspects how secure the code is for that particular
property, and for a produced binary on a given architecture. Here,
we assume that the security level is expressed as an integer.
In order to demonstrate these annotations/properties, we con-
sider variants computing the (left-to-right) modular exponentiation
by squaring, which is commonly used in, e.g., RSA [39]. They return
the result of ak mod n computed with an accumulator, x, where a
and n are public variables, and k is some secret key.
Listing 11: Security Example: Square-and-Multiply
1 int sqmul(int a, unsigned int k, int n) {
2 int x = 1;
3 for (int i = 8*sizeof(int) - 1 ; i >= 0 ; i--) {
4 x = x*x % n;
5 if ((k >> i) & 1) {
6 x = x*a % n;
7 }
8 }
9 return x;
10 }
The condition of the if-statement on Line 5 detects the value of
the ith bit of the secret k, expressed in binary form. For every
iteration, Listing 11 computes the multiplication only if that bit is
a 1, which can be detected by observing execution time [28] or a
power profile [27], and thus leads to information leakage from both
time and power side-channel attacks.
Listing 12: Square-and-Multiply-Delay
1 int sqmul_delay(int a, unsigned int k, int n) {
2 int x = 1;
3 for (int i = 8*sizeof(int) - 1 ; i >= 0 ; i--) {
4 x = x*x % n;
5 if ((k >> i) & 1) {
6 __csl_time_average_iter(&time_mult)
7 x = x*a % n;
8 } else {
9 delay(time_mult);
10 }
11 }
12 return x;
13 }
Listing 12 is less vulnerable to time side-channel attacks because the
imbalance in execution time of the if-statement branches has been
addressed by introducing a delay in the else branch. time_mult is the
average execution time for the multiplication operation in the then
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Listing 13: Square-and-Multiply Comparison: Time SCA
1 int sec_lvl_time, sec_lvl_time_delay;
2
3 __csl_security_sca_time(&sec_lvl_time);
4 int x = sqmul(a, k, n);
5
6 __csl_security_sca_time(&sec_lvl_time_delay);
7 int y = sqmul_delay(a, k, n);
branch, obtained by using (Line 6) the time-capturing annotation
__csl_time_average_iter.
The CSL annotation for time side-channel attacks from Listing 10
can be used to measure calls to both sqmul and sqmul_delay, as in
Listing 13, where we would expect that sqmul_delay returns a higher
security level than the call to sqmul. However, this is not necessarily
the case for power profiles, that can be read (Simple Power Analysis
[27]) in order to detect whether or not a multiplication has been
computed during an iteration. In order to mitigate this, another
variant of the square-and-multiply function might be employed.
Listing 14: Square-and-Multiply-Always
1 int sqmul_always(int a, unsigned int k, int n) {
2 int x = 1;
3 int y;
4 for (int i = 8*sizeof(int) - 1 ; i >= 0 ; i--) {
5 x = x*x % n;
6 if ((k >> i) & 1) {
7 x = x*a % n;
8 } else {
9 y = x*a % n;
10 }
11 }
12 return x;
13 }
Here, a dummy variable, y, is introduced and both branches of the if
-statement perform the same operations. Similar to the time-based
security level in Listing 13, security levels based on power profiles
can be measured using the annotation in Listing 10.
Listing 15: Square-and-Multiply Comparison: Power SCA
1 int sec_lvl_power_delay, sec_lvl_power_always;
2
3 __csl_security_sca_power(&sec_lvl_power_delay);
4 int x = sqmul_delay(a, k, n);
5
6 __csl_security_sca_power(&sec_lvl_power_always);
7 int y = sqmul_always(a, k, n);
Here, security levels are stored in both sec_lvl_power_delay and sec
_lvl_power_always, where we would normally expect the security
level for sqmul_always to be greater than sqmul_delay. But the multi-
plication in the else branch of Listing 14 is a dummy operation, so
injecting a fault [52] in x*a % n will change the final result only if
the current secret bit is 1, thus leaking information. This is not the
case with the Montgomery Ladder [24] where both variables x and
y are interleaved accumulators. In Listing 16, a fault injected will
propagate through successive iterations, so will alter the final result
irrespective of the value of the current secret bit, preventing the
opponent to obtain secret information. The security level of state-
ments against fault-injection may be captured by the corresponding
annotation in Listing 10.
Listing 16: Montgomery Ladder
1 int montgomery_ladder(int a, unsigned int k, int n)
2 {
3 int x = 1;
4 int y = a;
5 for (int i = 8*sizeof(int) - 1 ; i >= 0 ; i--) {
6 if ((k >> i) & 1) {
7 x = x*y % n;
8 y = y*y % n;
9 } else {
10 y = y*x % n;
11 x = x*x % n;
12 }
13 }
14 return x;
15 }
Listing 17: Square-and-Multiply Comparison: Fault-
Injection
1 int sec_lvl_fault_always, sec_lvl_fault_ladder;
2
3 __csl_security_fault_injection(&sec_lvl_fault_always);
4 int x = sqmul_always(a, k, n);
5
6 __csl_security_fault_injection(&sec_lvl_fault_ladder);
7 int y = montgomery_ladder(a, k, n);
Similar to Listings 13 and 15, Listing 17 demonstrates the fault-
injection-based annotation, capturing security levels for calls to
sqmul_always and montgomery_ladder. Here, we would expect the secu-
rity level of montgomery_ladder to be greater than sqmul_always.
4.3 Assertions
Assertions in CSL allow programmers to express contracts about
their programs over the variables defined within it; e.g. the compar-
isons between security levels in Section 4.2. These variables may
be used to capture non-functional properties of, e.g., time, energy,
and security, as described in this section, or they may be normal
variables that are in scope in the language for which CSL is defined.
The assertion is checked using the model described in Section 5.
An assertion takes the following form.
1 __csl_assert( bool_expression );
Here, bool_expression is an expression that returns a boolean value.
The exact definition of well-formed expressions is derived from the
underlying model since it is the model that determines whether
the assertion holds, for a given context. In our exemplar imple-
mentation, this is a simple expression language comprising basic
arithmetic operators and the binary operations: conjunction, dis-
junction, equality, and the standard inequalities over numbers. This
may be extended to allow more complex expressions, given an
extended model and/or parser (Section 2.2).
In order to demonstrate the use of assertions, we extend Listing 9.
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Listing 18: CSL time example
1 double loop_time;
2 double iter_time;
3
4 __csl_time_worst(&loop_time);
5 for(int i =0; i < BOUND; i++){
6 __csl_time_average_iter(&iter_time)
7 f(i);
8 }
9
10 __csl_assert(loop_time <= (iter_time * BOUND));
Here, loop_time <= (iter_time * BOUND) is a normal boolean C expres-
sion. loop_time, iter_time and BOUND are all variables that are in scope
and contain values at the point of the assertion. The programmer
can call __csl_assert at any point in her C program, provided the free
variables within the boolean expression are in scope and have values
assigned to them. Assertions regarding security properties are ex-
pressed similarly. For example, given the square-and-multiply func-
tions in Listings 11 and 12, we might extend Listing 13 with an asser-
tion. Here, the security levels of the two function calls for time side-
1 int sec_lvl_time, sec_lvl_time_delay;
2
3 __csl_security_sca_time(&sec_lvl_time);
4 int x = sqmul(a, k, n);
5
6 __csl_security_sca_time(&sec_lvl_time_delay);
7 int y = sqmul_delay(a, k, n);
8
9 __csl_assert(sec_lvl_time <= sec_lvl_time_delay);
channel attacks are captured in sec_lvl_time and sec_lvl_time_delay
by the annotations on Lines 4 and 7, respectively, and the assertion
is the simple inequality, sec_lvl_time <= sec_lvl_time_delay.
4.4 Energy, Time and Security Properties as
First-class Citizens
An advantage to our approach is that lifting these non-functional
properties to the source level makes them first-class citizens of the
source language. This means that if the programmer annotates
their C source code with time, energy and security properties, these
properties are assigned to standard C variables, and can be used in
the usual way C variables can. For example, in the listing below,
the programmer uses CSL to obtain the energy usage of a simple
loop, and then following the loop, the energy usage is used in an if
statement.
1 __csl_energy_worst(&loop_energy);
2 for ( ...) {
3 ...
4 }
5
6 if (loop_energy <= 20 )
7 securealgorithm1();
8 else
9 secureAlgorithm2();
Here, loop_energy is obtained by calling the CSL construct at Line
1 in the expected way, and then used, in Line 6, as part of an if
statement. Here, loop_energy is checked to make sure that it does not
exceed 20 joules of energy, executing different secure algorithms
depending on the value of loop_energy as a result of the comparison.
5 CONTRACT DEFINITION AND
DERIVATION
An annotated C program is modelled using Idris in order to deter-
mine whether assertions within the program hold. Models of pro-
grams are automatically derived using the parser from Section 2.2
and are inhabitants of the type CLang.
Listing 19: Idris model type
1 data CLang : Type where
2 -- CSL
3 BlockTime : (x : String) -> (v : Nat) -> (k : CLang) -> CLang
4 BlockEnergy : (x : String) -> (v : Nat) -> (k : CLang) -> CLang
5 Assert : (asn : Env -> Assertion) -> (k : CLang) -> CLang
6 -- C Structures
7 DecVar : (x : String) -> (v : Nat) -> (k : CLang) -> CLang
8 Halt : CLang
CLang abstracts away all aspects of the annotated C program aside
from CSL assertions and the assignments of variables used in those
assertions; denoted respectively by Assert, BlockTime, BlockEnergy and
DecVar. Variables, x, in models are unique and represent only the
value that is live within the assertion. All values are modelled using
natural numbers (Nat) to facilitate proof derivation; extending this
to other types is a concern for future work. Where variables are
not natural numbers in the original program, it is currently left to
the parser (Section 2.2) to denote those original values consistently
into natural numbers.
Models are in continuation passing style, where, as is standard, k
denotes the continuation, and Halt denotes the end of a continuation.
For example, the assertion __csl_assert(x > 12);, when x = 13, can
be modelled as
1 DecVar "x" 13 (Assert asn Halt)
where asn is a function that models the assertion x > 12.
Assertions are boolean expressions that have a truth value, ex-
pressed via type inhabitance. Models can be constructed that con-
tain assertions that do not hold. This allows a report to be presented
to the programmer detailing whether, and how, each assertion holds.
Since assertions are likely to have free variables, the model must
specify a context, Env, via the function argument to the Assert con-
structor, that provides definitions for those variables (Listing 19,
Line 5, asn : Env -> Assertion). Contexts are defined as a mapping
of variable names to values; e.g. here, Env = List (String,Nat). Proof
terms of assertions are constructed by computing the normal forms
of assertions; contexts provide definitions for free variables in as-
sertions, allowing this. For example, in Listing 2, the variables
in dijkstra_assert are substituted for their values by lookup in env,
which is generated from definitions in the rest of the model, dijkstra.
The type of assertions, Assertion (Listing 19, Line 5), is effectively a
type alias for the type of boolean expressions, BooleanExpression.
Boolean expressions comprise conjunction (And) and disjunction (Or)
over boolean expressions, and equality (Eq) and (≤) (LTE) operations
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Listing 20: Assertion and boolean expressions definition
1 data Assertion : Type where
2 MkAssertion : BooleanExpression -> Assertion
3
4 data BooleanExpression : Type where
5 And : (x : BooleanExpression)
6 -> (y : BooleanExpression)
7 -> (xNF : BEvald x x')
8 -> (yNF : BEvald y y')
9 -> (prf : Dec (TyAnd x' y'))
10 -> BooleanExpression
11
12 Or : (x : BooleanExpression)
13 -> (y : BooleanExpression)
14 -> (xNF : BEvald x x')
15 -> (yNF : BEvald y y')
16 -> (prf : Dec (TyOr x' y'))
17 -> BooleanExpression
18
19 Eq : (x : NumericExpression)
20 -> (y : NumericExpression)
21 -> (xNF : Evald x x')
22 -> (yNF : Evald y y')
23 -> (prf : Dec (x' = y'))
24 -> BooleanExpression
25
26 LTE : (x : NumericExpression)
27 -> (y : NumericExpression)
28 -> (xNF : Evald x x')
29 -> (yNF : Evald y y')
30 -> (prf : Dec (x' `LTE` y'))
31 -> BooleanExpression
over natural numbers. Semantically, these functions are defined
in the usual way. Our implementation includes the other standard
inequality operators, but these are omitted here for clarity, since
they can be defined in terms of (≤).
Under our representation in Listing 20, each boolean expression
is a binary operation, with arguments denoted x and y. Boolean
expressions are extended with proof terms, xNF and yNF, for the re-
lations BEvald and Evald, and the truth value for the expression, prf.
Both xNF and yNF relate, depending on the operation, boolean or
numeric expressions with their normal forms. We say BEvald x x
', where x is a boolean expression and x' is the boolean (Bool) to
which x evaluates; and Evald x x', where x is a numeric expression
(Listing 21) and x' is the natural number (Nat) to which x evalu-
ates. The truth term for the corresponding predicate, prf, is defined
using the decidable proposition (Dec) and an underlying proposi-
tion that reflects the operation. For example, the truth value of And
(Listing 20, Line 9) has the type Dec (TyAnd x' y'), where TyAnd is a
type representing logical conjunction. When And evaluates to True,
1 data TyAnd : Bool -> Bool -> Type where
2 MkAnd : TyAnd True True
prf = Yes prf', where prf' is a constructive proof that TyAnd x' y' is
inhabited for the given x' and y'. For example, given prf : TyAnd
True True, prf = Yes MkAnd). Similarly, when And evaluates to False,
prf = No prf', where prf' is proof that the underlying proposition,
TyAnd x' y', would be a contradiction (i.e. is uninhabited) for the
given x' and y'.
Both equality and (≤) operations range over numeric expres-
sions, comprising literal values (Lit), variables (Var), addition (Add),
subtraction (Sub), multiplication (Mul), truncated division (Div), the
truncated logarithm to base 2 (Log), and the modulo operation (Mod).
Listing 21: Numeric expressions definition
1 data NumericExpression : Type where
2 Lit : (n : Nat) -> NumericExpression
3 Var : (x : String) -> NumericExpression
4 Log : (x : NumericExpression) -> NumericExpression
5 Plus : (x : NumericExpression) -> (y : NumericExpression) ->
NumericExpression
6 Sub : (x : NumericExpression) -> (y : NumericExpression) ->
NumericExpression
7 Mul : (x : NumericExpression) -> (y : NumericExpression) ->
NumericExpression
8 Div : (x : NumericExpression) -> (y : NumericExpression) ->
NumericExpression
9 Mod : (x : NumericExpression) -> (y : NumericExpression) ->
NumericExpression
Semantically, these functions are defined in the usual way. Values of
both BooleanExpression and NumericExpression are denoted into their
corresponding Idris prelude functions via beval and eval, respec-
tively.
Listing 22: Evaluation functions for boolean and numeric ex-
pressions
1 beval : (env : Env) -> (b : BooleanExpression) -> Bool
2 beval env (And x y xNF yNF (Yes prf)) = True
3 beval env (And x y xNF yNF (No contra)) = False
4 beval env (Or x y xNF yNF (Yes prf)) = True
5 beval env (Or x y xNF yNF (No contra)) = False
6 beval env (Eq x y xNF yNF (Yes prf)) = True
7 beval env (Eq x y xNF yNF (No contra)) = False
8 beval env (LTE x y xNF yNF (Yes prf)) = True
9 beval env (LTE x y xNF yNF (No contra)) = False
10
11 eval : (env : Env) -> (e : NumericExpression) -> Nat
12 eval env (Lit n) = n
13 eval env (Log n) = assert_total $ log2 (eval env n)
14 eval env (Var name) = case lookup name env of
15 Just value => value
16 Nothing => 0
17 eval env (Plus x y) = (eval env x) `plus` (eval env y)
18 eval env (Sub x y) = (eval env x) `minus` (eval env y)
19 eval env (Mul x y) = (eval env x) `mult` (eval env y)
20 eval env (Div x y) = assert_total $ (eval env x) `div` (eval env y)
21 eval env (Mod x y) = assert_total $ (eval env x) `mod` (eval env y)
Boolean expressions are reduced to a boolean value (beval) by dis-
criminating on prf. Numeric expressions are reduced to a natural
number (eval) by denoting each NumericExpression operation into the
respective Idris prelude function over natural numbers. Variables
(Var, Lines 14–16) are looked up in the context, env, by the list prelude
function lookup. The definition and generation of the Idris model
require that all free variables in assertions are defined in the context.
Consequently, the Nothing branch (Line 16) will, by definition, never
be reached, but is included because lookup returns a Maybe value and
eval returns a Nat. In the future, we intend to reflect this property
in the type, obviating the need for lookup. Similarly, the arithmetic
operations Log, Div, and Mod require assert_total to ensure evaluation
to normal form, since the respective Idris prelude functions, log,
div, and mod, are partially defined. We ensure that only models for
which there are defined instances of log, div, and mod are generated.
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In principle, it is possible to guarantee within the system that, for
those cases, only arguments for which there are defined behaviours
may be constructed, obviating the use of assert_total.
Reporting the Contract. For each model, the context and list of
assertions are derived using the function mkAssertions : CLang ->
List Assertion. mkAssertions is a fold over a model, whose step func-
tion collects assertions from Assert constructors, and variables and
values from BlockTime, BlockEnergy, and DecVar constructors. Construc-
tion of the list of assertions requires a proof of whether each as-
sertion holds, which is derived automatically via the reduction
functions beval and eval, in conjunction with decision procedures
for each boolean expression that is introduced via model gener-
ation. Decision procedures comprise: isAnd for conjunction; isOr
for disjunction; decEq from the Idris prelude for equality; and isLTE
from the Idris prelude for (≤). In order to illustrate this process,
we consider the model defined in Listing 23: This represents an
Listing 23: The Idris Abstract Model
1 dijkstra : CLang
2 dijkstra = BlockTime "comparison_time" 23
3 $ DecVar "EDGES" 1026
4 $ DecVar "NUM_NODES" 256
5 $ BlockTime "time_spent" 32933
6 $ Assert dijkstra_assert
7 $ Halt
8
9 dijkstra_assert : Env -> Assertion
10 dijkstra_assert env =
11 let
12 p0 = (Var "time_spent")
13 p0' = eval env p0
14
15 p1 = (Var "EDGES")
16 p1' = eval env p1
17
18 p2 = (Var "NUM_NODES")
19 p2' = eval env p2
20
21 p3 = (Var "comparison_time")
22 p3' = eval env p3
23
24 p4 = (Mul (Mul p1 (Log p2)) p3)
25 p4' = eval env p4
26 in
27 MkAssertion $ LTE p0 p4
28 (MkEvald p0 p0')
29 (MkEvald p4 p4')
30 (isLTE p0' p4')
abstract interpretation [10] of the original annotated C program
in Listing 1; mkAssertions represents the abstract execution. Opera-
tionally, it folds over dijkstra, constructing the context: At an Assert
1 env : Env
2 env = [("comparison_time",23)
3 ,("EDGES",1026)
4 ,("NUM_NODES",256)
5 ,("time_spent",32933)]
constructor, the step function passes the above context, env, to the
assertion function, dijkstra_assert. Since Idris is strictly evaluated,
this will cause the normalisation of p0 and p4, producing p0' = 32933
and p4' = 188784, respectively, via the (eval env) (partially applied)
function. The LTE constructor requires a value of type Dec (LTE p0'
p4), which is provided by the evaluation of the term (isLTE p0' p4'),
or (isLTE 32933 188784), substituting the values of both p0' and p4'. In
this example, the prelude function, isLTE, is used to provide a value
that inhabits the type Dec (LTE p0' p4). Under the Curry-Howard
correspondence and Intensional Type Theories [44] upon which
Idris is based, the type Dec (LTE p0' p4) is a proposition and the re-
sult of (isLTE 32933 188784) is a proof of that proposition, and thus
a proof of the assertion itself. Accordingly, we say that the result
of the abstract evaluation of dijkstra is a mechanical proof of the
assertions therein, where Idris is used as a proof assistant.
6 EVALUATION
We provide our experimental system setup and describe our evalu-
ation results.
6.1 Experiment Setup
For our experiments we evaluate across two different machines.
The first set of experiments, corryvreckan, are conducted on a ser-
ver with Intel Xeon E5-2690 CPU with 28 cores, running at 2.6
Ghz with 256 GB of RAM, with the Scientific Linux 6.2 operating
system with gcc 4.8.5 with optimisations turned off. The second
set of experiments, raspberrypi, are executed on a Raspberry Pi
Model 3 B, Quad-core 1.2Ghz Broadcom BCM2837 64bit CPU with
1 GB of RAM, with Raspbian GNU Linux (9) and gcc 6.3.0 with
optimisations turned off.
6.2 The Beebs Benchmarks
For purposes of our evaluation, we use the Beebs benchmarks,
which are designed for evaluating WCET and energy analysis for
embedded systems [37]. In this paper, we chose a subset of the
sorting algorithms from Beebs, where we measured the theoretical
worse-case execution time based on the worst-case complexity of
the sorting algorithm. For each sorting algorithm we annotated the
source-code with CSL contructs measuring the average comparison
time of the sorting algorithm, together with the total sorting time for
the given input. The CSL assertion then asserts that the theoretical
upper-bound (calculated from the average comparison time and
the worst-case complexity) is indeed an upper bound for the given
Beebs input data. In all cases, the contract system verifies that the
worst-case is indeed an upper bound.
6.3 Experiments on corryvreckan
Our experiments for corryvreckan are summarised in Figure 3. In
the figure, we show for each benchmark, the input size (i.e. the
array size) of the given Beebs benchmark data, the calculated worst-
case complexity of the algorithmn, the average operation (or com-
parison) time for the algorithm (measured using monotonic clock
time, in milliseconds), the worst-case theoretical time, based on the
worse-case complexity and the average operation time, the number
of operations performed in the benchmark, and the total Beebs time.
For each benchmark, we show that the worst-case time is an upper
bound on the total runtime. In Figure 2(a), we show a summary of
the corryvreckan results as a bar chart. Here, the y-axis is showing
a logarithmic scale of milliseconds. The blue bar shows the actual
time, and the red bar shows the theoretical worst-case time based
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(a) Comparison of Beebs runtimes versus worst-case on corryvreckan
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(b) Comparison of Beebs runtimes versus worst-case on raspberrypi
Figure 2: Comparison of Beebs runtimes versus worst-case theoretical bounds
on the average operation time and the worst-case complexity of
the algorithm; in all cases the actual time is below the theoretical
worst-case time. In all cases, the actual time does not exceed the
worst-case time. For mergesort-asc and mergesort-equal, there were
0 operations performed due to the input lists already being sorted;
we omit their results here.
6.4 Experiments on raspberrypi
Our experiments for the raspberry pi proceed in a similar manner
to those shown for corryvreckan, and are given in Figure 4. The
Raspberry Pi is a small embedded device, no untypical of the types
of devices found in embedded systems. It allows us to model the
benchmarks in an embedded system, in contrast to the multicore
system, corryvreckan, and show the applicability of the Drive sys-
tem to an embedded space. The benchmarks were executed in a
similar manner to those for corryvreckan, with the same data inputs
as supplied by the Beebs benchmarks. Again, mergesort-asc and
mergesort-desc have 0 operations, so complete in almost 0 time; we
again omit their results. We omit details of dijsktra and select for
the Raspberry Pi due to segmentation faults in the executions. A
comparison of the Beebs actual times (shown in blue) versus the
theoretical worst-case time (shown in red) are given in Figure 2(b).
7 RELATEDWORK
There is a great deal of work within the programming language
community on the calculation and bounding of resource usage,
generally with a focus on memory usage or worst-case execution
time [8, 50]. Programming language approaches typically seek to
allow the programmer to reason about resources at the type level,
inter alia. Approaches include: the use of abstract interpretation
to infer symbolic bounds [19]; the use of amortised analyses to
automatically infer polynomial multivariate bounds [21]; the use
of refinement types to ensure that successive iterations cost less
than previous iterations in incremental computing [8]; the use of
linear dependent types to bound the number of reductions that
may be applied [30]; and, similarly, the use of sized types to analyse
space usage [7, 22, 47]. Where these approaches generally operate
within specific type systems or languages, applying them to other
languages, e.g. C, would typically be a substantial task. Whilst
a model of some program in the given target language could be
constructed, these analyses would result in an analysis of the model,
not the original program. Moreover, as static approaches, these do
not necessarily reflect actual execution times since architectural
aspects (e.g. caching) are not modelled within the (type) system.
Conversely, the approach presented here uses concrete resource
information derived from the original program, thereby allowing
us to reason about the original program itself and in a manner that
directly and accurately reflects resource usage.
Beyond time and space, recent work has exposed the energy
consumption of a program in the form of a function that is parame-
terised by program arguments [16, 32]. Security aspects, such as
information flow and leakage, have also been modelled using type
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BEEBs Example BEEBs Input Size Worst-case compl. Avg. Op. Time # BEEBs Ops Worst-case time BEEBs time
dijkstra 10 (v2) + (e +v) logv 0.000227 220 0.0536 0.02599
bs 15 logn 0.000333 3 0.00130099 0.000999
bubblesort 100 n2 0.0000869 5050 0.86 0.831
insertsort 11 n2 0.00009 9 0.0109 0.00099
mergesort-pathological 100 n logn 0.0000784 51 0.521 0.004
mergesort-random 100 n logn 0.00011728 486 0.0779 0.057
mergesort-mostdesc 100 n logn 0.00006811989 367 0.045257 0.0249
mergesort-mostasc 100 n logn 0.0001016949 59 0.06756 0.006
mergesort-desc 100 n logn 0.000101124 356 0.0671 0.036
mergesort-jittered 100 n logn 0.00022 9 0.1476 0.00199
mergesort-mosteq 100 n logn 0.0000716 405 0.04757 0.029
mergesort-worst 100 n logn 0.000111 522 0.07382 0.058
qsort 20 n2 0.0000625 16 0.0249 0.001
select 20 n2 0.00005882 34 0.0235 0.001
Figure 3: Experiments on corryvreckan. Times shown inmilliseconds.
BEEBs Example BEEBs Input Size Worst-case compl. Avg. Op. Time # BEEBs Ops Worst-case time BEEBs time
bs 15 logn 0.00099 3 0.00386782 0.0030
bubblesort 100 n2 0.0003599 5050 3.5999 0.0759
insertsort 11 n2 0.00018 9 0.022 0.00699
mergesort-pathological 100 n logn 0.00043137 51 0.28659 0.0219
mergesort-random 100 n logn 0.000434 486 0.293 0.21
mergesort-mostdesc 100 n logn 0.0004 367 0.293 0.1619
mergesort-mostasc 100 n logn 0.00033 59 0.225 0.02
mergesort-desc 100 n logn 0.000469 356 0.31166 0.167
mergesort-jittered 100 n logn 0.00088 9 0.59 0.008
mergesort-mosteq 100 n logn 0.000434 405 0.288 0.1759
mergesort-worst 100 n logn 0.000469 522 0.31182 0.24499
qsort 20 n2 0.000312 16 0.125 0.00499
Figure 4: Experiments on raspberry pi. Times shown inmilliseconds
systems [6, 48]. As additional non-functional properties become of
interest, it becomes increasingly relevant to combine or compose
said properties when reasoning about them in the program. To the
best of our knowledge, existing approaches are generally limited
to a single resource. The few approaches that do trade energy re-
quirements with performance constraints [3, 51], with one notable
exception [33], treat both properties as a constraint within the com-
pilation/optimisation stage, and do not allow the programmer to
reason about them. Conversely, and since the approach presented
here builds upon, and uses, existing tools, it is both possible and sim-
ple to express assertions about multiple non-functional properties
at the program level.
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The aforementioned notable exception, the Ciao Preprocessor
system (CiaoPP) [20, 33, 41], enables the programmer to infer re-
source usage, and reason about the correctness of programs with
respect to resource usage information. CiaoPP achieves this by
translating annotated programs in high-level languages, e.g. Java
[18] and XC [1], into sequences of Horn clauses. This Horn Clause
Intermediate Representation (HC IR) is used to reason about (the
correctness of) transformations over the global state of the program.
Despite the apparent similarities of both Drive and CiaoPP systems,
beyond the choice of model representation, there are three distinct
differences:
(1) the approach to resource analysis;
(2) the exposure of resource usage information to the program-
mer; and,
(3) the scope of the respective models.
CiaoPP uses its HC IR to derive resource usage information:
reporting static resource analyses for both time and energy [33],
and memory and the transmission of bits [41]. To the best of our
knowledge, no security analyses have thus far been a subject of
CiaoPP resource usage analysis. The use of external tooling in
Drive represents a trade-off between the tightness of integration
and assurances, as seen in CiaoPP, and an increased flexibility in
choice of approaches to resource analyses. External tooling need
not be limited to the use of a specific representation, but different
tools may instead use their own internal representation, potentially
allowing a wider range of analyses. However, external tooling must
generally be trusted by the programmer, where trust might be
derived from, i.e., empirical testing or external proofs.
The resource analyses available within the CiaoPP system return
functions that take the size of relevant data as an argument. Con-
versely, the Drive system expects ground values for specific instances
of the annotated statement. Moreover, unlike Drive, CiaoPP does
not reflect resource usage values into the original program and thus
this information cannot be used in a first-class way. Whilst it should
be noted that the underlying Ciao does facilitate first-class resource
usage values, CiaoPP does not propagate those values back into the
original language [33].
Beyond resource analysis, the scope and approach to verification
represents a significant difference between the two approaches.
CiaoPP models the (concrete and intended) semantics of a given
programwritten in a annotated high-level language using theHC IR,
in part to facilitate its resource analyses. Conversely, Drive models
only those parts of the program that are necessary for determining
validity of CSL assertions; in part, facilitated by the use of external
tools. The certificates derived from these models represent proofs
by reflection or contradiction of whether an assertion holds. Drive
can thus be seen as a proof-carrying approach [35], where the
certificates are checkable by the Idris type checker. CiaoPP similarly
provides the fixpoint computed by the preprocessor [2]. Due to the
nature of the CiaoPP analysis, these fixpoints may become large as
the program itself grows larger. Whilst the certificates produced
by the Drive system are focussed on assertions and carry minimal
information, due to the constructive nature of proofs in Idris, and
the use of natural numbers in Drive, large numbers may produce
large certificates. Future work will focus on making these proofs
smaller, easier to read and understand, and investigate making these
proofs first-class; i.e. accessible within the program being analysed.
One consequence of the relative immaturity of the technique, is
that the assertion language supported by CiaoPP is more expressive
than that which is supported by Drive. Future work will consider
increasing the expressiveness of the Drive assertion language; for
example, allowing the inference of intervals for free variables in
non-ground assertions.
Measurement and Inference of Resource Usage. The approach pre-
sented here is dependent upon other tools, e.g. the WCET-aware
C Compiler [14], in order to provide resource usage values to the
model. Unsurprisingly, the worst-case execution time (WCET) com-
munity has been a significant driver of such tools; a general over-
view of methods and tools is provided by Wilhelm et al. [50]. For
example, one of the more popular methods used for WCET analysis
is the Implicit Path Enumeration Technique, introduced by Li et
al. [31], which estimates best- and worst-case times for embedded
software without needing to enumerate all possible control-paths
in a program.
Energy usage is of increasing interest due to the prevalence
of battery-powered systems. The measurement of energy usage
typically comes in three forms: 1) instruction set models for sim-
ple, usually predictable, embedded architectures [26, 46]; 2) hard-
ware performance counter models that utilise more complex archi-
tectures’ performance events (e.g. cache misses and branch miss-
predictions) [42]; and 3) the use of linear regression on an amount
of empirical data to extract unknown terms that can be utilised to
construct an energy model [36].
Regarding security properties, in [12] the authors used Haskell’s
type system to enforce secure information flow (non-interference
[17]), augmented with flexible declassification policies, and secure
computation on untainted data (both verified if the source code
compiles), and mandatory user input validation (verified at run-
time). Their lightweight Haskell library for writing and reading files
ensures that values in sensitive applications come from a trusted
source of input, and provides a simple way for formalizing declas-
sification policies. But the programmer is forced to validate every
untrusted value and to provide two different paths (whether an
error occurs or not) in the source code, while in our paper we are
making no assumption on the developer behaviour.
FABLE [45] is a core formalism for a programming language
in which programmers can 1) define custom security labels and
associate them with the data they protect using dependent types,
and 2) define the interpretation of labels in special enforcement
policy functions separated from the rest of the program. This allows
to write programs that enforce a variety of security policies, not
restricted as above to information flow security policies, such as
access control, static and dynamic information flow with forms of
declassification, provenance tracking and policies based on secu-
rity automata. FABLE does not guarantee that a security policy is
correctly implemented, but its design simplifies proof of this fact.
As shown by both frameworks, in the literature the focus is on
communication security properties like confidentiality/secrecy [40]
or integrity [9] of the data. The security examples, properties and
contracts expressed in this paper are more focused on preventing
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information leakage from the computation itself (side-channel at-
tacks and fault injection). Our approach is more general because it
does not rely on particular primitives to express security properties.
Another general approach is LOCKS [29], which is a generic
and formal DSL (domain specific language) that allows a security
practitioner to express and compose (both qualitative and quantita-
tive) security goals (embracing a wide number of attributes such as
cost, damage, probability, etc.) in a declarative manner. These goals
are expressed as queries over an attack model, the SAM (structural
attack model), which is based on partially ordered sets of successful
attacks that dictates which steps needs to be carried out and in
which order, and is used as the semantic model for LOCKS. These
security goals can be compared to the (more accessible) regular C
expressions that we used for the assertions, and thus LOCKS can
be compared to Drive. But they lack an automated tool like Idris to
verify whether these goals are achieved or not.
8 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we presented a novel framework, called Drive, allow-
ing the programmer to reason about Energy, Time and Security
(ETS) properties of their source-code. Moreover, Drive allows the
programmer to express these ETS properties as first-class properties
of the underlying language. We also introduced a new DSL, called
the Contract Specification Language (CSL) to allow programmers
to annotate the C source-code with ETS properties and source-level
provable contracts. These source-level contracts are verified by
an underlying type system that models the high-level structures
of the source-code, giving a decidable proof that the contract has
been met. This is used to allow the programmer to, for example,
place upper bounds on sections of their source code in terms of e.g.
time and energy, or define a security level that they require to be
met. We evaluated our approach using a set of sorting algorithms
from the Beebs benchmarks suite, on a 28-core multi-core machine
and a raspberry pi model 3 B. Both results allowed us to evaluate
our framework on showing that the worst-case complexity of the
sorting algorithms is indeed an upper-bound for the supplied Beebs
benchmarks data sets.
In the future, we plan to extend our work in a number of new
directions.
• We intend to make contexts parameters of the assertion type,
define models such that variables carrying proofs of their
inclusion in the context, and avoid the use of partial defini-
tions for arithmetic operations. This will obviate the need
for evaluation relations and an explicit lookup operation.
• We will extend the assertions to be able to take into account
open terms. For example, the contract may be verified correct
depending upon some assumption.
• We plan to extend our type-system to model the source code
using a small-step semantics; this would enable us to model
and verify assertions based on user-defined functions.
• Wewill evaluate our technique on a number of examples that
are dependent on the energy consumption of the application
w.r.t to the total energy budget of the device. For example,
modelling the Beebs benchmarks on a small embedded de-
vice, such as the Discovery STM32.
• We plan to extend our framework on security contracts,
including evaluating over a number of security benchmarks,
testing security attacks such as side-channel attacks, etc.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We thank Annelie Heuser and Tania Richmond for their help re-
garding side-channel analysis and the Montgomery ladder.
This work was supported by the EU Horizon 2020 project, Team-
Play (https://www.teamplay-h2020.eu), grant number 779882, and
UK EPSRC Discovery, grant number EP/P020631/1.
REFERENCES
[1] Xc specification ver. 1.0 (x5965a) (2011), https://www.xmos.com/developer/xc-
specification
[2] Albert, E., Arenas, P., Puebla, G., Hermenegildo, M.V.: Certificate size reduction
in abstraction-carrying code. TPLP 12(3), 283–318 (2012)
[3] Andrei, A., Eles, P., Jovanovic, O., Schmitz, M.T., Ogniewski, J., Peng, Z.: Quasi-
static voltage scaling for energy minimization with time constraints. IEEE Trans.
VLSI Syst. 19(1), 10–23 (2011)
[4] Bell, D.E., La Padula, L.J.: Secure computer system: Unified exposition and multics
interpretation. In: Tech report ESD-TR-75-306. pp. 1–133. Mitre Corp, Bedford,
Ma. (1976)
[5] Brady, E.C.: Idris —: Systems programming meets full dependent types.
In: Proceedings of the 5th ACM Workshop on Programming Languages
Meets Program Verification. pp. 43–54. PLPV ’11, ACM, New York, NY,
USA (2011). https://doi.org/10.1145/1929529.1929536, http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/
1929529.1929536
[6] Chen, H., Tiu, A., Xu, Z., Liu, Y.: A permission-dependent type system for secure
information flow analysis. In: CSF. pp. 218–232. IEEE Computer Society (2018)
[7] Chin, W., Khoo, S.: Calculating sized types. Higher-Order and Symbolic Compu-
tation 14(2-3), 261–300 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1012996816178, https:
//doi.org/10.1023/A:1012996816178
[8] Çiçek, E., Garg, D., Acar, U.A.: Refinement types for incremental computational
complexity. In: Programming Languages and Systems - 24th European Sympo-
sium on Programming, ESOP 2015, Held as Part of the European Joint Conferences
on Theory and Practice of Software, ETAPS 2015, London, UK, April 11-18, 2015.
Proceedings. pp. 406–431 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46669-8_17,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46669-8_17
[9] Clark, D.D., Wilson, D.R.: A comparison of commercial and military computer
security policies. In: 1987 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. pp. 184–184
(April 1987). https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.1987.10001
[10] Cousot, P., Cousot, R.: Abstract interpretation: A unified lattice model for static
analysis of programs by construction or approximation of fixpoints. In: Confer-
ence Record of the Fourth ACM Symposium on Principles of Programming
Languages, Los Angeles, California, USA, January 1977. pp. 238–252 (1977).
https://doi.org/10.1145/512950.512973, https://doi.org/10.1145/512950.512973
[11] David, H., Gorbatov, E., Hanebutte, U.R., Khanna, R., Le, C.: Rapl: Memory power
estimation and capping. In: Proceedings of the 16th ACM/IEEE International
Symposium on Low Power Electronics and Design. pp. 189–194. ISLPED ’10,
ACM, New York, NY, USA (2010). https://doi.org/10.1145/1840845.1840883, http:
//doi.acm.org/10.1145/1840845.1840883
[12] Di Pirro, M., Conti, M., Lazzeretti, R.: Ensuring information security
by using haskell’s advanced type system. In: 2017 International Carna-
han Conference on Security Technology (ICCST). pp. 1–6 (Oct 2017).
https://doi.org/10.1109/CCST.2017.8167844
[13] Falk, H., Lokuciejewski, P.: A compiler framework for the reduction of
worst-case execution times. Real-Time Systems 46(2), 251–300 (Oct
2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11241-010-9101-x, https://doi.org/10.1007/
s11241-010-9101-x
[14] Falk, H., Lokuciejewski, P.: A compiler framework for the reduction of worst-case
execution times. Real-Time Systems 46(2), 251–300 (2010)
[15] Focardi, R., Martinelli, F.: A uniform approach for the definition of security
properties. In: Wing, J.M., Woodcock, J., Davies, J. (eds.) FM’99 — Formal Methods.
pp. 794–813. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg (1999)
[16] Georgiou, K., Kerrison, S., Chamski, Z., Eder, K.: Energy transparency for deeply
embedded programs. TACO 14(1), 8:1–8:26 (2017)
[17] Goguen, J.A., Meseguer, J.: Security policies and security models. In:
1982 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. pp. 11–11 (April 1982).
https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.1982.10014
[18] Gosling, J., Joy, B., Steele, G.L., Bracha, G., Buckley, A.: The Java Language
Specification, Java SE 8 Edition. Addison-Wesley Professional, 1st edn. (2014)
Type-Driven Verification of Non-functional Properties Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA
[19] Gulwani, S., Mehra, K.K., Chilimbi, T.M.: SPEED: precise and efficient static
estimation of program computational complexity. In: Proceedings of the 36th
ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages,
POPL 2009, Savannah, GA, USA, January 21-23, 2009. pp. 127–139 (2009).
https://doi.org/10.1145/1480881.1480898, https://doi.org/10.1145/1480881.1480898
[20] Hermenegildo, M.V., Puebla, G., Bueno, F., López-García, P.: Integrated program
debugging, verification, and optimization using abstract interpretation (and
the ciao system preprocessor). Sci. Comput. Program. 58(1-2), 115–140 (2005).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scico.2005.02.006, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scico.2005.02.
006
[21] Hoffmann, J., Aehlig, K., Hofmann, M.: Multivariate amortized resource
analysis. ACM Trans. Program. Lang. Syst. 34(3), 14:1–14:62 (2012).
https://doi.org/10.1145/2362389.2362393, https://doi.org/10.1145/2362389.2362393
[22] Hughes, J., Pareto, L.: Recursion and dynamic data-structures in bounded
space: Towards embedded ML programming. In: Proceedings of the
fourth ACM SIGPLAN International Conference on Functional Program-
ming (ICFP ’99), Paris, France, September 27-29, 1999. pp. 70–81 (1999).
https://doi.org/10.1145/317636.317785, https://doi.org/10.1145/317636.317785
[23] Hutton, G.: Programming in Haskell. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY,
USA (2007)
[24] Joye, M., Yen, S.M.: The montgomery powering ladder. In: Kaliski, B.S., Koç, ç.K.,
Paar, C. (eds.) Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2002. pp.
291–302. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg (2003)
[25] Kästner, D., Pister, M., Wegener, S., Ferdinand, C.: TimeWeaver: A Tool
for Hybrid Worst-Case Execution Time Analysis. In: Altmeyer, S. (ed.)
19th International Workshop on Worst-Case Execution Time Analysis
(WCET 2019). OpenAccess Series in Informatics (OASIcs), vol. 72, pp. 1:1–
1:11. Schloss Dagstuhl–Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik, Dagstuhl, Germany
(2019). https://doi.org/10.4230/OASIcs.WCET.2019.1, http://drops.dagstuhl.de/
opus/volltexte/2019/10766
[26] Kerrison, S., Eder, K.: Energy modeling of software for a hardware multithreaded
embedded microprocessor. ACM Trans. Embedded Comput. Syst. 14(3), 56:1–
56:25 (2015)
[27] Kocher, P., Jaffe, J., Jun, B.: Differential power analysis. In: Wiener, M. (ed.)
Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO’ 99. pp. 388–397. Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
Berlin, Heidelberg (1999)
[28] Kocher, P.C.: Timing attacks on implementations of diffie-hellman, rsa, dss, and
other systems. In: Koblitz, N. (ed.) Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO ’96. pp.
104–113. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg (1996)
[29] Kumar, R., Rensink, A., Stoelinga, M.: Locks: A property specification lan-
guage for security goals. In: Proceedings of the 33rd Annual ACM Sympo-
sium on Applied Computing. pp. 1907–1915. SAC ’18, ACM, New York, NY,
USA (2018). https://doi.org/10.1145/3167132.3167336, http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/
3167132.3167336
[30] Lago, U.D., Petit, B.: The geometry of types. In: The 40th Annual ACM
SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages,
POPL ’13, Rome, Italy - January 23 - 25, 2013. pp. 167–178 (2013).
https://doi.org/10.1145/2429069.2429090, https://doi.org/10.1145/2429069.2429090
[31] Li, Y.S., Malik, S.: Performance analysis of embedded software using implicit path
enumeration. IEEE Trans. on CAD of Integrated Circuits and Systems 16(12),
1477–1487 (1997)
[32] Liqat, U., Kerrison, S., Serrano, A., Georgiou, K., López-García, P., Grech, N.,
Hermenegildo, M.V., Eder, K.: Energy consumption analysis of programs based
on XMOS isa-level models. In: LOPSTR. Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
vol. 8901, pp. 72–90. Springer (2013)
[33] López-García, P., Darmawan, L., Klemen, M., Liqat, U., Bueno, F., Hermenegildo,
M.V.: Interval-based resource usage verification by translation into horn
clauses and an application to energy consumption. TPLP 18(2), 167–
223 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1017/S1471068418000042, https://doi.org/10.1017/
S1471068418000042
[34] Morse, J., Kerrison, S., Eder, K.: On the limitations of analysing worst-case dy-
namic energy of processing. ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Sys-
tems 17(3) (2 2018). https://doi.org/10.1145/3173042
[35] Necula, G.C.: Proof-carrying code. In: Conference Record of POPL’97: The 24th
ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages,
Papers Presented at the Symposium, Paris, France, 15-17 January 1997. pp. 106–
119 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1145/263699.263712, https://doi.org/10.1145/263699.
263712
[36] Núñez-Yáñez, J.L., Lore, G.: Enabling accurate modeling of power and energy con-
sumption in an arm-based system-on-chip. Microprocessors and Microsystems -
Embedded Hardware Design 37(3), 319–332 (2013)
[37] Pallister, J., Hollis, S.J., Bennett, J.: BEEBS: open benchmarks for energy measure-
ments on embedded platforms. CoRR abs/1308.5174 (2013), http://arxiv.org/abs/
1308.5174
[38] Reparaz, O., Balasch, J., Verbauwhede, I.: Dude, is my code constant time? In:
Design, Automation Test in Europe Conference Exhibition (DATE), 2017. pp.
1697–1702 (March 2017). https://doi.org/10.23919/DATE.2017.7927267
[39] Rivest, R.L., Shamir, A., Adleman, L.: A method for obtaining digital signatures
and public-key cryptosystems. Communications of the ACM 21(2), 120–126
(1978)
[40] Ryan, P.Y.: Mathematical models of computer security. In: International School
on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design. pp. 1–62. Springer (2000)
[41] Serrano, A., López-García, P., Hermenegildo, M.V.: Resource usage analysis of
logic programs via abstract interpretation using sized types. TPLP 14(4-5), 739–
754 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1017/S147106841400057X, https://doi.org/10.1017/
S147106841400057X
[42] Shao, Y.S., Brooks, D.M.: Energy characterization and instruction-level energy
model of intel’s xeon phi processor. In: ISLPED. pp. 389–394. IEEE (2013)
[43] Slama, F.: Automatic generation of proof terms in dependently typed program-
ming languages. Ph.D. thesis, University of St Andrews (2018)
[44] Slama, F., Brady, E.: Automatically proving equivalence by type-safe re-
flection. In: Intelligent Computer Mathematics - 10th International Confer-
ence, CICM 2017, Edinburgh, UK, July 17-21, 2017, Proceedings. pp. 40–
55 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62075-6_4, https://doi.org/10.1007/
978-3-319-62075-6_4
[45] Swamy, N., Corcoran, B.J., Hicks, M.: Fable: A language for enforcing user-defined
security policies. In: 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (sp 2008). pp.
369–383 (May 2008). https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2008.29
[46] Tiwari, V., Malik, S., Wolfe, A.: Power analysis of embedded software: a first
step towards software power minimization. IEEE Trans. VLSI Syst. 2(4), 437–445
(1994)
[47] Vasconcelos, P.B., Hammond, K.: Inferring cost equations for recursive, polymor-
phic and higher-order functional programs. In: Implementation of Functional
Languages, 15th International Workshop, IFL 2003, Edinburgh, UK, September
8-11, 2003, Revised Papers. pp. 86–101 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-
27861-0_6, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-27861-0_6
[48] Volpano, D.M., Irvine, C.E., Smith, G.: A sound type system for secure flow
analysis. Journal of Computer Security 4(2/3), 167–188 (1996)
[49] Wilhelm, R., Engblom, J., Ermedahl, A., Holsti, N., Thesing, S., Whalley, D.,
Bernat, G., Ferdinand, C., Heckmann, R., Mitra, T., Mueller, F., Puaut, I.,
Puschner, P., Staschulat, J., Stenström, P.: The worst-case execution-time prob-
lem&mdash;overview of methods and survey of tools. ACM Trans. Embed. Com-
put. Syst. 7(3), 36:1–36:53 (May 2008). https://doi.org/10.1145/1347375.1347389,
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1347375.1347389
[50] Wilhelm, R., Engblom, J., Ermedahl, A., Holsti, N., Thesing, S., Whalley, D.,
Bernat, G., Ferdinand, C., Heckmann, R., Mitra, T., Mueller, F., Puaut, I.,
Puschner, P., Staschulat, J., Stenström, P.: The Worst-case Execution-time Prob-
lem&Mdash;Overview of Methods and Survey of Tools. ACMTrans. Embed. Com-
put. Syst. 7(3), 36:1–36:53 (May 2008). https://doi.org/10.1145/1347375.1347389,
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1347375.1347389
[51] Xian, C., Lu, Y., Li, Z.: Energy-aware scheduling for real-time multiprocessor
systems with uncertain task execution time. In: DAC. pp. 664–669. IEEE (2007)
[52] Ziade, H., Ayoubi, R., Velazco, R.: A survey on fault injection techniques. Inter-
national Arab Journal of Information Technology Vol. 1, No. 2, July, 171–186
(2004), https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00105562
